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Abstract
This work studies a stochastic optimal control problem for a pension scheme which provides an income-
drawdown policy to its members after their retirement. To manage the scheme efficiently, the manager and
members agree to share the investment risk based on a pre-decided risk-sharing rule. The objective is to
maximise both sides’ utilities by controlling the manager’s investment in risky assets and members’ benefit
withdrawals. We use stochastic affine class models to describe the force of mortality of the members’ population
and consider a longevity bond whose coupon payment is linked to a survival index. In our framework, we
also investigate the longevity basis risk, which arises when the members’ and the longevity bond’s reference
populations show different mortality behaviours. By applying the dynamic programming principle to solve
the corresponding HJB equations, we derive optimal solutions for the single- and sub-population cases. Our
numerical results show that by sharing the risk, both manager and members increase their utility. Moreover,
even in the presence of longevity basis risk, we demonstrate that the longevity bond acts as an effective hedging
instrument.
Keywords: Pension scheme, longevity basis risk, mortality-linked instrument, stochastic control, dynamic
programming principle
1 Introduction
Pension schemes face a wide range of risks such as investment risk, interest rate risk, inflation risk and longevity
risk. Among all the risks, the longevity risk is becoming a non-negligible challenge to pension schemes. The
longevity risk is the risk that the actual life expectancy may be higher than anticipated. It is a positive trend
for society that people’s average life expectancy is increasing over the last decades. However, the pension schemes
are suffering from the loss caused by the unexpected increasing benefit outgo accompanied by the longevity trend.
Cocco and Gomes [2012] shows that the average life expectancy of 65-year-old US (UK) males increases by 1.2
(1.5) years per decade. As a consequence, a defined benefit scheme (DB scheme) for those populations would have
needed 29% more wealth in 2007 than in 1970.
Instead of a classical DB or DC scheme, this work considers a pension scheme which provides an income-
drawdown option to its members in the decumulation phase. The decumulation phase refers to the period after
the retirement of pension scheme members. The drawdown option gives the members the right to withdraw money
periodically from the scheme until death time, while keeps the remaining amount in the pension scheme. The
management of the scheme starts from the retirement time of the members and ends until the last member passes
away. Thus, the investment period can last for decades. Due to the long investment horizon, the scheme may face
significant interest rate risk and inflation risk. However, the main focus of this work is on hedging the longevity
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risk. We assume the risk-free interest rate to be constant and do not consider the inflation risk. In other words,
we only consider the investment risk and longevity risk. The scheme manager invests in a representative stock to
gain investment returns, and he is exposed to the investment risk. As the members tend to live longer, the number
of surviving members each year is more than expected, resulting in an increase of benefit withdrawals. Also, the
length of decumulation period is increasing due to the members’ growing life expectancy. One way to reduce the
pension scheme’s unexpected loss caused by its exposure to the longevity risk is to gain a better understanding of
the future mortality evolution. Another way is to seek some financial instruments to transfer the longevity risk to
the financial market.
The force of mortality, which represents the instantaneous rate of mortality at a certain time, is useful when
studying mortality behaviour. In a continuous-time framework, Luciano and Vigna [2005] modelled the force of
mortality by affine processes and calibrated the models to the observed and projected UK mortality tables. They
claimed that the affine process with a deterministic part that increases exponentially could describe the force of
mortality properly. This paper applies Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) and Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) process to model
the force of mortality of certain populations. To hedge the longevity risk using financial instruments, Blake and
Burrows [2001] introduced a survivor bond which provides coupon payment based on the number of survivors
in a chosen reference population. Under a stochastic force of mortality framework, Menoncin [2008] studied the
optimal consumption and investment strategy for an individual investor using the longevity bond to hedge the
investor’s longevity risk. He argued that the longevity bond plays a crucial role in the individual’s longevity risk
management. However, the longevity basis risk arises when the force of mortality of the longevity bond reference
population correlates imperfectly with the pension members’ force of mortality. To deal with the longevity basis
risk, Wong et al. [2014] applied the cointegration technique to study the mean-variance hedging of longevity risk
for an insurance company with a longevity bond. They suggested that cointegration is vital in longevity risk
management. In this paper, we introduce a rolling zero-coupon longevity bond to hedge the scheme’s longevity
exposure. We show that the longevity bond provides an efficient way to hedge the longevity risk both in the cases
with and without longevity basis risk.
Under a continuous-time framework, this work aims to determine the optimal investment and benefit with-
drawal strategy for a pension scheme that provides an income-drawdown policy in the decumulation phase. After
retirement, the members continuously withdraw money from the pension scheme until death. Upon death, a deter-
ministic proportion of the passed away members’ pension account balance is given to the manager as compensation.
The proposed optimal control problem considers both benefit of the scheme members and profit of the manager
by incorporating a risk-sharing rule parameter. By applying the dynamic programming principle, we first solve
the optimisation problem under a general case. Then, we drive explicit solutions for single- and sub-population
cases. Numerical studies on single-population and sub-population OU models are conducted to investigate the
optimal portfolio strategy and optimal benefit withdrawal rate dynamically. Comparison studies are provided to
analyse the performance of longevity risk hedge. We also implement sensitivity analyses to look into the impact
of the market price of risk and risk-sharing rule parameter. Our results show that with the absence of longevity
basis risk, the longevity bond provides efficient longevity risk hedge when the members show a longevity trend.
When the members are a sub-population of the longevity bond reference population, the presence of the longevity
basis risk may weaken the longevity bond’s hedging performance. However, it still provides a way to hedge the
longevity risk and offers a risk premium. We also establish that an equal-risk-sharing rule is beneficial to both
the members and the manager in the long run. This paper contributes to the literature by studying a stochastic
optimal control problem for pension schemes in the presence of longevity risk and longevity basis risk. Our optimal
control problem also incorporates a risk-sharing rule parameter which decides the agreement on how to share the
risk between the members and the manager such that both parties benefit in the long run.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the mathematical framework of the problem
and derives the optimal solution in the general case. Explicit solutions under single-population and sub-population
models are given in Section 3. In Section 4, numerical simulations are carried out to investigate the optimal
portfolio strategy and benefit withdrawal. Comparison and sensitivity analyses are also conducted to discuss the
role of longevity bond and impact of model parameters in the optimal solutions. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2
2 Mathematical Framework
The literature on optimal control problems for pension schemes with deterministic mortality behaviour of the
populations is rich. However, given the fluctuations in the mortality behaviour over time, it is more practical to
use stochastic mortality rates. In this work, we use affine class models for the force of mortalities of members’
population and the reference population for longevity bond. When, the two populations are different, we use n = 2
populations in our framework and when they are the same, we use n = 1 population.
2.1 The stochastic force of mortality
We consider an infinite time horizon T = [0,∞) where time 0 represents the retirement time of all the populations.
Let {W(t) | t ∈ T} = {(W1(t), ...,Wn (t),WS(t))′ | t ∈ T} denote an (n + 1)-dimensional standard Brownian
motion on a complete filtered probability space (Ω,F, {F(t)}t≥0,P). Here, n denotes the number of populations
and P denotes the physical measure where we observe the longevity behaviours of the populations, and the financial
market.
For i ≤ n , let pi (t) and λi (t) denote the survival probability and the force of mortality, respectively, of the ith
population at time t . The two are related through the following relation:
dpi (t)
pi (t)
= –λi (t)dt , pi (0) = 1.
For any s ≥ t ∈ T, pi (s)pi (t) = e
–
∫ s
t
λi (u)du is the survival probability of the ith population between time t and s . For
notational simplicity, we denote by {λ(t) | t ∈ T} = {(λ1(t), ...,λn (t))′ | t ∈ T}, the vector of force of mortalities
and assume that it evolves as
dλ(t) = A(t ,λ)dt + Σ′(t ,λ)dW(t), (1)
where
A(t ,λ) =
 a1(t ,λ)...
an (t ,λ)
 , Σ′(t ,λ) =
 σ1(t ,λ1) · · · σ1,n (t ,λn ) 0... . . . ... ...
σn ,1(t ,λ1) · · · σn ,n (t ,λn ) 0
 .
For any i , j = 1, . . . ,n , ai (t ,λ) and σij (t ,λj ) are assumed to be continuous functions. In the following, we will
use different affine class models for λ(t).
2.2 The financial market
We consider a frictionless financial market consisting of a stock and a rolling zero-coupon longevity bond. The
money market account is denoted by R(t),
dR(t)
R(t)
= rdt , R(0) = 1,
where r denotes the constant risk-free interest rate. In this work we consider a constant risk-free rate of interest
as our focus is to understand the impact of longevity and investment risk in a pensions scheme. Our analysis can
also be performed in the presence of a stochastic interest rate.
Under a risk-neutral probability measure, the price of a financial derivative is the discounted expected value
of its future payoff. We thus introduce an equivalent risk-neutral probability measure Q by the following Radon-
Nikodym derivative
dQ
dP
= Z(T) = exp
(
–
∫ T
0
θ′(t ,λ)dW(t) – 1
2
∫ T
0
‖θ(t ,λ)‖2dt
)
,
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where {θ(t ,λ) | t ∈ T} = {(θ1(t ,λ1), · · · , θn (t ,λn ), θS)′ | t ∈ T} is Rn -valued, F-adapted process such that Z(t)
is a martingale and E[Z] = 1. θ(t ,λ) is called the vector of market prices of risks and measures the additional
amount of investment return when risk increases by one unit. By Girsanov’s theorem, {WQ(t) | t ∈ T} is an
(n + 1)-dimensional standard Brownian motion under Q such that
WQ(t) = W(t) +
∫ t
0
θ(s ,λ)ds . (2)
The stock price process {S(t) | t ∈ T} is given as
dS(t)
S(t)
= rdt + σS [θSdt + dWS(t)] , S(0) = S0,
where σs denotes the constant stock price volatility. The risk premium of the stock is θSσS.
In the literature, several types of mortality-linked securities are proposed to hedge the longevity risk. The
values of these securities depend on the mortality index for some given populations: higher the survival rate,
more valuable the securities. The definition below provides a short description of one such security, a zero-coupon
longevity bond.
Definition 1. A zero-coupon longevity bond is a contract paying a face amount which is equal to the survival
probability of the reference population from time 0 until a fixed maturity time T.
There may be multiple longevity bonds based on different reference populations in the market. However, as an
illustration of the use of longevity bond, we only consider one longevity bond in this work. Let the ith population
be the reference population of the zero-coupon longevity bond which pays pi (T)pi (0) at maturity. The arbitrage-free
price of the longevity bond at time t is given as
L(t , T) = EQt
[
R(T)
R(t)
pi (T)
pi (0)
]
= EQt
[
e–r(T–t)–
∫ T
0
λi (u)du
]
= e–
∫ t
0
λi (u)du–r(T–t)E
Q
t
[
e–
∫ T
t
λi (u)du
]
.
Applying Itô’s formula and using (2) gives
dL(t , T)
L(t , T)
= rdt +
n∑
i ,j=1
σijL (t , T)
[
θj (t ,λj )dt + dWj (t)
]
,
where σijL (t , T) =
∂L(t ,T)
∂λj (t)
σij (t ,λj )
L(t ,T) .
For any t ∈ [0, T], the time to maturity of the zero-coupon longevity bond is T – t . In practice, it is impossible
for an investor to find all zero-coupon longevity bonds in the market with any time to maturity T – t . By taking
inspiration from the arguments in Boulier et al. [2001] on rolling zero-coupon bonds, we introduce a rolling zero-
coupon longevity bond L(t) (with a little abuse of notation) with constant time to maturity T. The use of a rolling
zero-coupon longevity bond in our set-up simplifies the calculations. The dynamics of L(t) under P is given as
dL(t)
L(t)
= rdt +
n∑
i ,j=1
σ
ij
L (t)
[
θj (t ,λj ) + dWj (t)
]
.
From the above, we can see that L(t) provides a longevity risk premium of
∑n
i ,j=1 σ
ij
L (t)θj (t ,λj ). Any zero-coupon
longevity bond L(t , T) can be replicated by using the rolling longevity bond L(t) and cash. The following equation
shows the relationship between L(t , T) and L(t)
dL(t , s)
L(t , s)
=
(
1 –
∑n
i ,j=1 σ
ij
L (t , s)∑n
i ,j=1 σ
ij
L (t)
)
dR(t)
R(t)
+
∑n–1
i ,j=1 σ
ij
L (t , s)∑n
i ,j=1 σ
ij
L (t)
dL(t)
L(t)
.
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2.3 The optimisation problem
We study the optimal benefit withdrawal rate and investment strategy in the decumulation phase for a pension
scheme that provides an income-drawdown option. That is, the members are allowed to withdraw money periodi-
cally from the scheme until death. Upon death, pi ∈ [0, 1] fraction of the passed away members’ pension balance is
delivered to the scheme manager as compensation. While the remaining 1 – pi fraction of the balance stays in the
scheme’s fund pool. Let αS(t), αL(t) and α0(t) denote the investments in stock, rolling longevity bond and money
market, respectively. In addition, let β(t) denote the amount of benefit withdrawal and Y(t) the scheme’s wealth.
We assume that the force of mortality of pension members is described by λj (t). In other words, population j
represents the pension members.
To study the dynamics of the scheme’s wealth, we employ a similar method used in He and Liang [2013b] by
first looking at the discrete-time changes in scheme’s wealth. For any t ∈ T and a small positive number ∆, the
returns on stock, longevity bond and money market account are given by
S(t + ∆) – S(t)
S(t)
αS(t),
L(t + ∆) – L(t)
L(t)
αL(t),
R(t + ∆) – R(t)
R(t)
α0(t).
Let µ(t , t + ∆) denote the rate of investment return. Then, we have
µ(t , t + ∆)Y(t) =S(t + ∆) – S(t)
S(t)
αS(t) +
L(t + ∆) – L(t)
L(t)
αL(t) +
R(t + ∆) – R(t)
R(t)
α0(t).
Let q(t , t +∆) denote the proportion of the members who pass away in time interval (t , t +∆). The total amount
of passed away members’ pension equals to q(t , t +∆)Y(t). During this time period, the scheme manager receives
piq(t , t +∆)Y(t) as compensation. In the meantime, the members withdraw β(t)∆ as benefits. Thus, the scheme’s
cashflow in this period is given by
µ(t , t + ∆)Y(t) – piq(t , t + ∆)Y(t) – β(t)∆.
At time t + ∆, 1 – q(t , t + ∆) fraction of the members survive, and the scheme wealth is equally distributed into
each surviving member’s pension account. Therefore, we have
Y(t + ∆) =
(
Y(t) + µ(t , t + ∆)Y(t) – q(t , t + ∆)piY(t) – β(t)∆
) 1
1 – q(t , t + ∆) .
Since λj (t) is the force of mortality of members, we have 1 – q(t , t + ∆) = e
–
∫ t+∆
t
λj (u)du . The Taylor series
approximation gives
1
1 – q(t , t + ∆) = e
∫ t+∆
t
λj (u)du = 1 + λj (t)∆ + o(∆).
Thereafter, we have
Y(t + ∆) =
(
Y(t) + µ(t , t + ∆)Y(t) – q(t , t + ∆)piY(t) – β(t)∆
)(
1 + λj (t)∆ + o(∆)
)
.
Since
µ(t , t + ∆)λj (t)∆ = o(∆), q(t , t + ∆)λj (t)∆ = o(∆),
we get
Y(t + ∆) = Y(t) + µ(t , t + ∆)Y(t) – q(t , t + ∆)piY(t) – β(t)∆ + λj (t)∆Y(t) + o(∆).
Furthermore,
Y(t + ∆) – Y(t)
∆ =
µ(t , t + ∆)
∆ Y(t) – piY(t)
q(t , t + ∆)
∆ – β(t) + λj (t)Y(t) + o(∆).
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The following equations hold:
lim
∆→0
q(t , t + ∆)
∆ =λj (t),
lim
∆→0
µ(t , t + ∆)Y(t) =dS(t)
S(t)
αS(t) +
dL(t)
L(t)
αL(t) +
dR(t)
R(t)
α0(t).
Thus, taking ∆→ 0 we obtain the continuous-time version of the scheme’s wealth dynamics:
dY(t) =
[
rY(t) + (1 – pi)λj (t)Y(t) + αS(t)σSθS + αL(t)
n–1∑
i ,j=1
σ
ij
L (t)θj (t) – β(t)
]
dt
+ αS(t)σSdWS(t) + αL(t)
n–1∑
i ,j=1
σijL (t)dWj (t).
Here, we use the fact that α0(t) = Y(t) – αS(t) – αL(t). It is worth noticing that the wealth process here is not
a self-financing wealth process since there are continuous benefits withdrawal from the scheme. Also, at any time
t ∈ T, the manager receives piλj (t)Y(t)dt amount of money out from the scheme as compensation. Meanwhile, the
scheme continuously receives (1 – pi)λj (t)Y(t) from the passed away members which is called the mortality credit
in He and Liang [2013a].
At any time, the pension scheme manager decides the benefits withdrawal rate and the investment strategy.
The manager works not only for his own benefit but also for the benefit of scheme members. This is also known as
first-best principal-agent problem where the agent is paid a fraction of the scheme’s wealth at the stochastic death
time. More specifically, we consider an optimisation problem which combines the manager’s and the members’
utilities. Denote by τ the stochastic death time of the pension members, the objective function is given as
J(Y,λ;αS,αL,β) = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e–rsUP(β(s))1{τ≥s}ds
]
+ φE
[
e–rτUA(piY(τ))
]
= E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e–rspj (s)
(
UP(β(s)) + φλj (s)UA(piY(s))
)
ds
]
where UP(·) and UA(·) denote the utility functions of the principal (members) and the agent (manager). The
non-negative constant φ can be viewed as a parameter that determines the risk-sharing rule between the principal
and the agent. The case φ = 0 corresponds to the situation when the manager works for only the sake of members.
In this case, the objective is to maximise the members’ running utility from benefit withdrawals while the manager
pays no attention to his own utility. The case 0 < φ < 1 prioritizes the members’ utility. When φ = 1, the objective
function puts equal importance on members’ and manager’s utility.
To specify the optimisation problem, we set UP(·) and UA(·) as log utility functions:
UA(x ) = ln x , UP(x ) = ln x , ∀x > 0.
Besides, upon death, we assume the total amount of passed away members’ remaining pension is paid to the
manager (i.e. pi = 1). The wealth process is now
dY(t) =
[
rY(t) + αS(t)σSθS + αL(t)
n–1∑
i ,j=1
σijL (t)θj (t) – β(t)
]
dt
+ αS(t)σSdWS(t) + αL(t)
n–1∑
i ,j=1
σijL (t)dWj (t). (3)
It should be noticed that, at any time t ∈ T, the manager receives c(t) = λi (t)Y(t) as his compensation.
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The optimisation problem is thus defined as supαS,αL,βE
[ ∫∞
0 e
–rspj (s)
(
ln(β(s)) + φλj (s) ln(Y(s))
)
ds
]
s.t. (1) and (3) hold.
(4)
This optimal control problem can be solved by applying the dynamic programming principle, and the solution is
given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The solution to optimisation problem (4) is
β∗(t)
Y(t)
=
1
G(t ,λ)
,
α∗S(t)
Y(t)
=
θS
σS
,
α∗L(t)
Y(t)
=
∑n–1
i ,j=1 σ
ij
L (t)θj (t ,λj )∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L (t)
)2 +
∑n–1
i ,j=1 σ
ij
L (t)Σ
′Gλ(t ,λ)∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L (t)
)2
G(t ,λ)
,
where
G(t ,λ) = Et
[∫ ∞
t
(φλj (s) + 1)e
–
∫ s
t
(r+λj (u))duds
]
.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.
3 Explicit solutions
This section gives the explicit solutions to the optimal control problem proposed before in single-population and
sub-population cases. In the literature, e.g. Luciano and Vigna [2005] and Wong et al. [2014], several continuous-
time stochastic models for force of mortality are studied. For example, OU process, CIR process and Feller process.
In this section, we use OU and CIR processes to model the stochastic force of mortality.
3.1 Single-population model
Let n = 1, that is, we assume that the reference population of the longevity bond happens to be the scheme
members’ population. We expect that the investment in the longevity bond can hedge the scheme’s longevity risk
effectively, since the uncertainty in the longevity bond value correlates the members’ longevity risk perfectly. Now,
(1) takes the following form:
dλ1(t) = (a1(t) – b1λ1(t)) dt + σ1(t ,λ1)dW1(t),
where b1 is a constant. According to Menoncin and Regis [2017], a1(t) is defined as
a1(t) = b1
(
ν1 +
1
∆1
(
1 +
1
b1∆1
)
e
t–m1
∆1
)
,
where m1, ν1 and ∆1 are constants. Particularly, m1 equals the modal value of life expectancy of the members.
The initial value of the force of mortality is calculated according to the Gompertz-Makeham function
λ1(0) = ν1 +
1
∆1
e–
m1
∆1 .
The continuous function σ1(t ,λ1) takes different forms for different processes. For instance:
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 OU process: σ1(t ,λ1) = σ1, and
dλ1(t) = (a1(t) – b1λ1(t)) dt + σ1dW1(t). (5)
 CIR process: σ1(t ,λ1) = σ1
√
λ1(t), and
dλ1(t) = (a1(t) – b1λ1(t)) dt + σ1
√
λ1dW1(t). (6)
In what follows, we apply dynamic programming principle to solve the single-population optimisation problem.
Proposition 2 and 3 give the explicit solutions under OU process and CIR process settings, respectively.
Proposition 2. Suppose that λ1(t) follows the OU process (5). Then, we have
Et
[
e–
∫ s
t
λ1(u)du
]
= eA0(t ,s)–A1(t ,s)λ1(t),
where
A1(t , s) =
1 – e–b1(s–t)
b1
, A0(t , s) = –
∫ s
t
(
a1(u)A1(u , s) –
1
2
σ21A
2
1(u , s)
)
du .
Suppose θ1(t ,λ1) := θ1. Then, the solution to the single-population optimisation problem (4) is given as
β∗(t)
Y(t)
=
1
G(t ,λ1)
,
α∗S(t)
Y(t)
=
θS
σS
,
α∗L(t)
Y(t)
=
θ1
σL(t)
+
σ1
σL(t)
Gλ1(t ,λ1)
G(t ,λ1)
,
where
σL(t) = – A1(t , t +T)σ1,
G(t ,λ1) = φλ1(t)
∫ ∞
t
e–(b1+r)(s–t)+A0(t ,s)–A1(t ,s)λ1(t)ds
+ φ
∫ ∞
t
∫ s
t
[
a1(u) – σ21A1(u , s)
]
du e–r(s–t)+A0(t ,s)–A1(t ,s)λ1(t)ds
+
∫ ∞
t
e–r(s–t)+A0(t ,s)–A1(t ,s)λ1(t)ds .
To derive the optimal solution, we define a new equivalent probability measure P˜. The complete proof is given
in Appendix B.
Proposition 3. Suppose that λ1(t) follows the CIR process (6). Then, we have
Et
[
e–
∫ s
t
λ1(u)du
]
= eA0(t ,s)–A1(t ,s)λ1(t),
where
A1(t , s) =
2(eη(s–t) – 1)
(b1 + η)(eη(s–t) – 1) + 2η
, η =
√
b21 + 2σ
2
1 ,
A0(t , s) = –
∫ s
t
a1(u)A1(u , s)du .
Suppose θ1(t ,λ1) := θ1
√
λ1(t). Then, the solution to the single-population optimisation problem (4) is given
as
β∗(t)
Y(t)
=
1
G(t ,λ1)
,
α∗S(t)
Y(t)
=
θS
σS
,
α∗L(t)
Y(t)
=
θ1
√
λ1(t)
σL(t)
+
σ1
√
λ1(t)
σL(t)
Gλ1(t ,λ1)
G(t ,λ1)
,
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where
σL(t) = – A1(t , t +T)σ1
√
λ1(t),
G(t ,λ1) = φλ1(t)
∫ ∞
t
e–(b1+r)(s–t)+A0(t ,s)–A1(t ,s)λ1(t)–σ
2
1
∫ s
t
A1(u ,s)duds
+ φ
∫ ∞
t
∫ s
t
a1(u)e
–b1(s–u)–σ21
∫ s
u
A1(v ,s)dvdu e–r(s–t)+A0(t ,s)–A1(t ,s)λ1(t)ds
+
∫ ∞
t
e–r(s–t)+A0(t ,s)–A1(t ,s)λ1(t)ds .
As the proof of above result is similar to the proof of Proposition 2, we omit it here to avoid repetition.
We learn from Proposition 2 and 3 that the optimal portfolio weight on stock under OU and CIR processes
are the same and keep constant over time. However, it is difficult to see from the solution how the longevity bond
investment changes over time, because α
∗
L(t)
Y(t) depends on G(t ,λ1) and Gλ1(t ,λ1). Later in Section 4, we perform
numerical simulations to investigate the optimal investment strategy and benefit withdrawal rate dynamically.
3.2 Sub-population model
Based on different mortality indices and maturity times, there may be different longevity bonds in the market. It
may be interesting to study our problem in a market setting with multiple longevity bonds. However, we only
consider one longevity bond in our framework as our main focus is on longevity risk hedging. In this section, we
study the case where the longevity bond’s reference population is different from the pension members’ population.
More specifically, we set n = 2 and denote the index population of the longevity bond by Population 1, and use
Population 2 to denote the pension members’ population. In practice, the reference population of longevity bond
tends to be large and could be much larger than pension schemes’ reference population. Therefore, we assume that
the pension members are a sub-population of the index population. Under this sub-population assumption (see,
Wong et al. [2014]), vectors A(t ,λ) and Σ′(t ,λ) in (1) take the following form:
A(t ,λ) =
[
a1(t) + b1λ1(t)
a2(t) + b21λ1(t) + b22λ2(t)
]
, Σ′(t ,λ) =
[
σ1(t ,λ1) 0 0
σ21(t ,λ1) σ22(t ,λ2) 0
]
, (7)
where b1, b21 and b22 are constant numbers.
ai (t) = bi
(
νi +
1
∆i
(
1 +
1
bi∆i
)
e
t–mi
∆i
)
, for i = 1, 2,
where νi are ∆i constants. The constants m1 and m2 are modal values of life expectancy of Population 1 and
Population 2, respectively.
Under OU and CIR processes, the continuous functions σ1(t ,λ1), σ21(t ,λ1) and σ22(t ,λ2) in vector Σ′(t ,λ)
are given as:
 OU process:
Σ′(t ,λ) =
[
σ1 0 0
σ21 σ22 0
]
.
 CIR process:
Σ′(t ,λ) =
[
σ1
√
λ1(t) 0 0
σ21
√
λ1(t) σ22
√
λ2(t) 0
]
.
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In this sub-population model, there are two state variables. Moreover, the state variable λ2(t) correlates with the
state variable λ1(t). This increases the difficulty of solving the optimisation problem. In this case, an analytical
solution may not always be available. In the following, we provide Proposition 4 and 5 for the solutions to the
sub-population optimisation problem under OU and CIR settings, respectively.
Proposition 4. Suppose Population 2 is a sub-population of Population 1, and the force of mortalities follow
OU processes: the dynamics of λ1(t) and λ2(t) are described as
dλ1(t) =
(
a1(t) + b1λ1(t)
)
dt + σ1dW1(t),
dλ2(t) =
(
a2(t) + b21λ1(t) + b22λ2(t)
)
dt + σ21dW1(t) + σ22dW2(t).
Then, we have
Et
[
e–
∫ s
t
λ(u)du
]
= eA0(t ,s)–A1(t ,s)λ1(t),
Et
[
e–
∫ s
t
λ2(u)du
]
= eC0(t ,s)–C1(t ,s)λ1(t)–C2(t ,s)λ2(t),
where functions A0(t , s) and A1(t , s) are the same as in Proposition 2. The functions C0(t , s), C1(t , s) and
C2(t , s) are
C2(t , s) =
1
b22
(
1 – e–b22(s–t)
)
,
C1(t , s) =
b21
b1(b1 – b22)
(
1 – e–b1(s–t)
)
+
b21
b22(b1 – b22)
,
C0(t , s) = –
∫ s
t
[
a1(u)C1(u , s) + a2(u)C2(u , s) –
1
2
σ21C
2
1(u , s)
–
1
2
(σ221 + σ22)
2C22(u , s) – σ1σ21C1(u , s)C2(u , s)
]
du .
Suppose θ1(t ,λ1) := θ1. Then, the solution to the sub-population optimisation problem is given as
β∗(t)
Y(t)
=
1
G(t ,λ1,λ2)
,
α∗S(t)
Y(t)
=
θS
σS
,
α∗L(t)
Y(t)
=
θ1
σL(t)
+
σ1
σL(t)
Gλ1(t ,λ1,λ2)
G(t ,λ1,λ2)
+
σ21
σL(t)
Gλ1(t ,λ1,λ2)
G(t ,λ1,λ2)
,
where
σL(t) = – A1(t , t +T)σ1,
G(t ,λ1,λ2) = φ
b21
b1 – b22
λ1(t)
∫ ∞
t
(
e–b1(s–t) – e–b22(s–t)
)
f (t , s)ds
+ φλ2(t)
∫ ∞
t
e–b22(s–t)f (t , s)ds – φ
∫ ∞
t
Γ1(t , s)f (t , s)ds
+ φ
b21
b1 – b22
∫ ∞
t
Γ2(t , s)f (t , s)ds +
∫ ∞
t
f (t , s)ds ,
f (t , s) =e–r(s–t)+C0(t ,s)–C1(t ,s)λ1(t)–C2(t ,s)λ2(t),
Γ1(t , s) =
∫ s
t
e–b22(s–u)
[ b21
b1 – b22
a1(u) – a2(u) + σ1σ21C1(u , s)
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+
(
σ221 + σ
2
22 –
b21σ1σ21
b1 – b22
)
C2(u , s)
]
du ,
Γ2(t , s) =
∫ s
t
e–b1(s–u)
[
a1(u) – σ21C1(u , s) – σ1σ21C2(u , s)
]
du .
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix C
Proposition 5. Suppose Population 2 is a sub-population of Population 1, and the force of mortalities follow
CIR processes: the dynamics of λ1(t) and λ2(t) are described as
dλ1(t) =
(
a1(t) + b1λ1(t)
)
dt + σ1
√
λ1(t)dW1(t),
dλ2(t) =
(
a2(t) + b21λ1(t) + b22λ2(t)
)
dt + σ21
√
λ1(t)dW1(t) + σ22
√
λ2(t)dW2(t).
Then, we have
Et
[
e–
∫ s
t
λ(u)du
]
= eA0(t ,s)–A1(t ,s)λ1(t),
Et
[
e–
∫ s
t
λ2(u)du
]
= eC0(t ,s)–C1(t ,s)λ1(t)–C2(t ,s)λ2(t),
where functions A0(t , s) and A1(t , s) are the same as in Proposition 3. The functions C0(t , s), C1(t , s) and
C2(t , s) are solutions to the following ODE system
0 = –
C0
∂t
+ a1C1 + a2C2,
0 = –
∂C1
∂t
+ b1C1 + b21C2 +
1
2
σ21C
2
1 +
1
2
σ221C
2
2 + σ1σ21C1A˜2,
0 = –
∂C2
∂t
+ b22C2 +
1
2
σ222C
2
2 – 1, (8)
with terminal conditions C0(s , s) = 0, C1(s , s) = 0 and C2(s , s) = 0.
Suppose θ1(t ,λ1) := θ1
√
λ1(t). Then, the solution to the sub-population optimisation problem is given as
β∗(t)
Y(t)
=
1
G(t ,λ1,λ2)
,
α∗S(t)
Y(t)
=
θS
σS
,
α∗L(t)
Y(t)
=
θ1
√
λ1(t)
σL(t)
+
σ1
√
λ1(t)
σL(t)
Gλ1(t ,λ1,λ2)
G(t ,λ1,λ2)
+
σ21
√
λ1(t)
σL(t)
Gλ1(t ,λ1,λ2)
G(t ,λ1,λ2)
,
where
σL(t) = – A1(t , t +T)σ1
√
λ1(t).
G(t ,λ1,λ2) satisfies
G(t ,λ1,λ2) =
∫ ∞
t
e–r(s–t)+C0(t ,s)–C1(t ,s)λ1(t)–C2(t ,s)λ2(t)ds + φ
∫ ∞
t
e–r(s–t)E˜t [λ2(s)] ds .
E˜[·] denotes the expectation under an equivalent measure P˜ which is defined as
dP˜
dP
= Z˜(s) = exp
(
–
∫ s
0
θ˜′(u , s)dW(u) – 1
2
∫ s
0
∥∥θ˜(u , s)∥∥2 du) ,
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where
θ˜(u , s) =
 σ1
√
λ1(u)C1(u , s) + σ21
√
λ1(u)C2(u , s)
σ22
√
λ2(u)C2(u , s)
0
 .
Proof. The Picard-LindelÃűf theorem ensures the existence of unique solutions to ODEs in (8). The rest of the
proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4 and is omitted here.
From Proposition 4 and 5, we see that the optimal portfolio weight on stock stays the same as in the single-
population case. The OU case has an analytical solution; however, the CIR case does not. In Section 4, we conduct
numerical studies to observe the hedging effect of the longevity bond in the sub-population OU process case.
4 Numerical applications
This section provides numerical simulations in the single- and sub-population cases using the results from Propo-
sition 2 and 4. A numerical study involving CIR models is not presented here as the results are similar to the OU
case. We observe the dynamics of the survival probability and look into the impact of the mortality behaviour on
the optimal strategy. We investigate the hedging performance of the longevity bond in the pension scheme’s risk
management and provide a sensitivity analysis on the market price of longevity risk. We are also interested in the
effect of the risk-sharing rule between the members and the manager.
Table 1 shows the values of parameters in our numerical examples. The time interval ∆ = 1/10 means that
we observe the mortality rates 10 times a year. Most of the values of the mortality model parameters are as
considered in other works (e.g. [Menoncin and Regis, 2017] and Milevsky [2001]). The values of other financial
market parameters are meant to be representative.
Table 1: Values of parameters for optimization problem.
Population 1 Population 2 Market Others
ν1 = 0.0009944 ν2 = 0.0009944 r = 0.04 T = 35
∆1 = 11.4000 ∆2 = 12.9374 θ1 = –0.0005 Y0 = 100
m1 = 86.4515 m2 = 89.18 θS = 0.05 ∆ = 1/10
b1 = 0.5610 b21 = 0.0028 σS = 0.15 φ = 0.8
σ1 = 0.0035 b22 = 0.6500 TL = 20
σ21 = 0.0040
σ22 = 0.0050
4.1 Single-population case
In the single-population case, we assume that the scheme members happen to be the reference population of
a longevity bond. The manager invests in this longevity bond to hedge the scheme’s longevity exposure. We
assume that the scheme members have similar mortality behaviour, and their retirement age is 65. The pension
scheme’s management starts from the retirement time and ends until the last member passes away. According to
the Gompertz-Makeham law of mortality, less than 5% of the population could survive until 100 years old given
that they are alive at 65 years old. Thus, we conduct numerical simulations with a 35-year time horizon (i.e.
T = 35).
Figure 1 shows three simulation paths to illustrate the dynamic mortality behaviour of the members. We see
that the survival probability decreases with time. In the bottom-right plot, we observe that for all three paths,
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less than 5% of the members survive until 100 years old indicating that it is reasonable to set T = 35. Suppose the
Gompertz-Makeham mortality law describes the average trend of the members’ mortality. We learn from the plots
in Figure 1 that the survival probability of the simulated path 1 is always higher than average. On the contrary, the
survival probability of path 2 is lower than expected. Path 3 does not show any particular trend. Figure 1 shows
the cumulative distribution function f (·) of the stochastic death time τ . We see from the plot that f (τ) peaks at
τ = 86.5 approximately. This is consistent with our model settings and choice of parameter values: m1 = 86.4515
in our model is the modal value of life span of the members. Generally, our observations imply that:
 path 1 shows a prominent longevity trend;
 path 2 on average has a lower survival rate;
 path 3 does not show any particular trend;
 For all three paths, most of the members’ deaths happen before the age of 86.5.
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Figure 1: 3 simulation paths for the survival probability and cumulative distribution function of τ
4.1.1 The base scenario
In the base scenario, we investigate the optimal benefit withdrawal rate and investment strategy. Besides, we
observe the scheme’s wealth level and manager’s compensation dynamically. Figure 2 shows the average investment
strategy over 100 simulation paths. We observe that the portfolio weight in the longevity bond drops over time.
As members get older, the scheme’s exposure to the longevity risk reduces, and the need for longevity protection
decreases. Accordingly, the manager reduces the portfolio weight in the longevity bond. The flat line which shows
the investment proportion in stock is a direct result from the optimal solutions in Proposition 2: the portfolio weight
in stock keeps constant and equals to θSσS . This constant investment strategy coincides with the result in the classical
Merton’s portfolio problem. The interpretation is that the constant market price of risk causes no change in the
manager’s investment behaviour. The proportion of the portfolio in the money market is α0(t)Y(t) = 1 –
αL(t)
Y(t) –
αS(t)
Y(t) .
We see that the portfolio weight in the money market is negative at first and then increases over time. The negative
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position in the initial years indicates that the manager borrows money from the money market, and invests in the
risky assets to gain risk premiums and increase the scheme’s wealth level. As αS(t)Y(t) keeps constant, and
αL(t)
Y(t)
decreases over time, the manager puts more weight in the money market. With the passage of time, the manager
becomes more conservative to avoid unexpected losses. Overall, the longevity bond dominates the investment
portfolio throughout the investment horizon. Even when members reach the age of 100, the manager puts around
50% of the portfolio in the longevity bond, indicating that the longevity bond could provide not only longevity
protection but also considerable risk premium.
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Figure 2: average optimal investment strategies over 100 paths
To observe general results, we show the average of 100 simulation paths of the optimal benefit withdrawal
proportion and rate, the scheme’s wealth and the manager’s compensation. From the top-left plot in Figure 3, we
see the optimal proportion of the scheme wealth β
∗
Y(t) withdrawn by members increases over time. Meanwhile, in
the top-right plot, we observe that the optimal benefit withdrawal rate β∗(t) reduces over time. This phenomenon
is explained by the scheme’s declining wealth process shown in the bottom-right plot. Although the manager
invests in the financial market, the average scheme level is decreasing throughout the time horizon due to the
continuous benefit withdrawals and compensation payments. The decreasing number of survival members, as well
as the declining scheme wealth, result in the drop in benefit withdrawal rate. The average compensation received
by the manager shows an interesting trend - it increases at first, peaks at around the 19th year and then drops
rapidly. The reason is that most members pass away before the age of 84. The compensation increases before the
mode of the members’ life span even though the scheme’s wealth level keeps decreasing. After reaching the modal
value of life expectancy, as most of the members have already passed away, the manger receives less compensation.
4.1.2 Comparison analysis
To test the hedging performance of longevity bond, we give the results in the case when the manager does not
include the longevity bond in the investment portfolio. Without the investment in longevity bond, the optimal
benefit withdrawal proportion β
∗(t)
Y(t) =
1
G(t ,λ1)
, and the optimal portfolio weight on stock α
∗
s (t)
Y(t) =
θS
σS
, are the same
as given in Proposition 2. The portfolio weight in money market equals to 1 – α
∗
S(t)
Y(t) and keeps constant over time.
Let β1(t) (c1(t)) and β2(t) (c1(t)) denote the benefit withdrawal (compensation) without and with investment in
longevity bond, respectively. Figure 4 shows the benefit withdrawal and compensation improvement by investing in
longevity bond. It shows that, for path 1, investing in longevity bond always results in higher benefit withdrawals
and compensations. For path 3, investing in longevity bond in general increases both members’ benefit withdrawals
and the manager’s compensation. Although, during some short period, longevity bond investment decreases the
withdrawals and compensations. However, for path 2, investment in longevity bond seems to cut down both
benefit withdrawals and compensations. As discussed earlier (see Figure 1), the survival probability on path 2 is
overall lower than the Gompertz-Makeham survival probability. It implies that the pension members tend to live
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Figure 3: average benefit withdrawal proportion, withdrawal rate, wealth, and compensation over 100 paths
shorter than expected. Likewise, Figure 1 suggests that for path 2, the random death age τ is more likely to be
the younger ages compared to the other paths - path 1 or path 3. As a result, the pension scheme does not face
the longevity risk and investing in the longevity bond actually loses money rather than making gains. As it is
a global trend that people’s average life expectancy is increasing, we argue that the pension schemes will benefit
from longevity bond investment as mirrored by the situation in path 1 and 3. To support our claim, we show the
average improvements of benefit withdrawal and compensation over 100 simulation paths in Figure 5. As shown,
there are low improvements in the first few years, but overall the improvements are significant over most of the
investment period. It indicates that investing in longevity bond increases both members’ benefit withdrawal rate
and manager’s compensation, and that it is beneficial to both members and manager.
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Figure 5: average improvements of benefit withdrawal and compensation over 100 paths
4.1.3 Sensitivity analysis
We are interested in the impact of the market price of risk on pension scheme’s risk management. It is difficult to
decide the market price of longevity risk (in other words θ1) due to the absence of longevity bonds in the market.
But we examine a few values of θ1 to give an illustration of the effects of the market price of longevity risk on
the optimal strategy, the benefit withdrawal and the manager’s compensation. In our base scenario, θ1 is set as
–5×10–4, and the longevity risk premium offered by the longevity bond is 4.4563×10–6. Compared with the stock’s
risk premium (7.5 × 10–3), the longevity risk premium is minimal. We show the optimal investment strategies in
the cases where θ1 = 0, –1.5 × 10–3 and –3 × 10–3. We know that a large absolute value of θ1 indicates high
risk premium offered by the longevity bond. Besides, large premiums should lead to more investment in longevity
bond. Figure 6 shows the investment strategies with different values of θ1. We can see that when the manager
does not add longevity bond to his portfolio, the optimal investment proportions in stock and money market keep
constant over time. The investment in the longevity bond does not affect the portfolio weight in stock while affects
the investment in the money market. The top-right plot shows that even in the case when the longevity bond
offers no risk premium (i.e. θ1 = 0), the proportion invested in the longevity bond is always higher than 40%. It
illustrates that the longevity bond provides a good way to hedge the scheme’s longevity risk. As shown in Figure
6, as the longevity risk premium decreases (i.e. lower θ1), more portfolio weight is put on the longevity bond. In
the bottom-right plot, θ1 = –0.0030 and the longevity risk premium equals to 2.6738× 10–5 which is again far less
than the stock’s risk premium. It implies that the manager continuously borrows money from the money market
to invest in risky assets throughout the whole time horizon. The intuition is that the longevity bond not only
provides longevity risk hedge, but also provides an attractive risk premium.
Figure 7 shows the improvements of benefit withdrawal and compensation when investing in longevity bond. As
shown for path 1, high market prices of longevity risk lead to high improvements in both manager’s compensation
and members’ benefit withdrawal. As discussed in Section 4.1.2, investing in longevity bond sometimes decreases
the benefit withdrawal and compensation and thus causes a ‘loss’. Here by ‘loss’, we mean loss in the members
benefit and manager compensation as the improvements by investing in longevity bond are negative. Nevertheless,
we observe from the plots in Figure 7 that a smaller θ1 reduces this loss.
We now investigate the impact of the risk-sharing parameter φ on the benefit withdrawal and manager com-
pensation. As stated before, φ decides the agreement between the manager and members on how to share the risk.
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Figure 6: impact of θ1 on the optimal investment strategy
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Figure 7: impact of θ1 on the benefit withdrawal and compensation improvements
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A high value of φ implies that more weight is put on the manager’s utility. When φ = 0, the manager works on
behalf of the members and only cares about the members’ benefit. This case corresponds to no risk-sharing. When
0 < φ < 1, more attention is put on the members’ benefit. In the case where φ = 1, the manager treats his own
profit and members’ benefit equally which corresponds to the case of equal risk-sharing. We test the cases when
φ takes values 0, 0.5 and 1. The case with φ = 0 is chosen as the reference case. Figure 8 shows the improve-
ment rates on benefit withdrawal and compensation (i.e. βφ(t)–βφ=0(t)
βφ=0(t)
and cφ(t)–cφ=0(t)cφ=0(t) ). As shown in the right
plot, higher the φ, higher the improvement in compensation. Compared to the case φ = 0, the equal risk-sharing
rule agreement improves the manager’s compensation by more than 20% at the end of the time horizon. For the
benefit withdrawal, a higher φ leads to higher withdrawals in the last 10 years, but reduces the withdrawals in
the early periods. To illustrate the impact of φ, we calculate the average discounted values of benefit withdrawals
and compensations over 100 simulation paths. We find that compared to the case φ = 0, φ = 1 increases the
discounted benefit withdrawal by 4.71% and the discounted compensation by 12.82%. Thus, both manager and
members benefit from sharing the risk equally.
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Figure 8: impact of φ on the benefit withdrawal and compensation
The previous discussions can be summarised as follows. The longevity bond offers an efficient way to hedge
the pension scheme’s longevity risk as it always dominates the investment portfolio. Moreover, both members and
manager benefit from investment in the longevity bond. Higher the longevity risk premium, more portfolio weight
is put on the longevity bond, and more the manager and members benefit from investing in it. Finally, an equal
risk-sharing rule is the most beneficial to both members and scheme’s manager.
4.2 Sub-population case
On the one hand, a pension scheme faces the longevity risk caused by its members’ more extended life span. On
the other hand, a pension scheme faces the longevity basis risk if the mortality behaviour of the scheme members is
imperfectly correlated with the longevity bond mortality index. In practice, pension schemes face longevity basis
risk as it is difficult to find a longevity bond in the market that is based exactly on the scheme members. Therefore,
the sub-population model may be more practical compared to the single-population model. In this section, we
assume that the longevity bond is based on a large population and the scheme members are a sub-population of
this large population. Furthermore, we assume that the life expectancy of the scheme members is higher than the
longevity bond reference population. If it is lower, the pension scheme may not face the longevity risk and there
is no need to invest in the longevity bond. We are interested in the optimal strategy and the hedging performance
of longevity bond in the presence of longevity basis risk.
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4.2.1 The base scenario
The values of parameters used in this section are as given in Table 1. For i = 1, 2, mi in (7) is the mode of life
expectancy of the ith population. m2 is set to be greater than m1 implying that the possible death age of the
pension members of Population 2 is higher than the longevity bond reference population in Population 1. Again,
we present three simulation paths in this section to observe the two populations’ mortality behaviour. Figure 9
shows the survival probabilities for Population 1 and Population 2. As expected, the average survival probability
of Population 1 is lower than Population 2. The plots below illustrate the following:
 Population 1
– path 1 has no particular trend;
– path 2 has a higher survival probability than expected;
– path 3 shows shorter life expectancy.
 Population 2:
– path 1 displays a lower survival probability in the first half of the time horizon;
– path 2 & 3 on average show longevity trend.
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Figure 9: survival probabilities for Population 1 and 2
Figure 10 shows the optimal investment strategy and benefit withdrawal in the sub-population case. The
optimal strategy is similar to the single-population case:
 the longevity bond dominates the portfolio;
 the portfolio weight on the longevity bond decreases over time while the holding in the money market
increases;
 the optimal investment proportion in the stock keeps constant;
 the percentage of the funds withdrawn by the members increases with time.
We learn from it that the longevity bond plays an essential role in the pension scheme’s risk management.
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Figure 10: average optimal portfolio strategy and benefit withdrawal in sub-population case
4.2.2 Comparison analysis
In Section 4.1, we show that in the single-population case, both the manager and members benefit from investing in
the longevity bond. Now, we conduct a comparison study in the sub-population case to see whether the longevity
bond still brings the advantage. For the simulation path 1, Figure 11 shows that investing in the longevity bond
in general increases the members’ benefit withdrawal and manager’s compensation. For path 2, the members and
manager benefit from investing in the longevity bond in the late 20-year time period, although the scheme suffers
from some loss in early years. While the simulation path 3 shows that neither the manager nor members take
advantage of longevity bond investment. To find out the reason for these phenomena, we check the simulated
survival probabilities. We learn from the bottom plots in Figure 9 that on path 3, scheme members in Population
2 live much longer than anticipated. Whereas, the survival probability of longevity bond reference population
(Population 1) on path 3 is lower. In this situation, the scheme suffers from severe longevity risk. , In this case, the
longevity bond can not provide an efficient longevity risk hedge because the reference population displays shorter
life expectancy. Since we assume the members are a sub-population of the longevity bond reference population,
the members should have similar mortality trend with the reference population, although with slightly different
behaviour. We believe that investing in the longevity bond can still be beneficial to both sides - manager and
scheme members - in the two population case.
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Figure 11: benefit and compensation improvement in sub-population case
Overall, we claim that the longevity bond provides a way to hedge the longevity risk in the sub-population
case. However, due to the presence of longevity basis risk, the hedging performance may be less effective than in
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the single-population case. The situation with multiple longevity bonds in the market may show different results
and is worthy of an independent future study. The sensitivity analyses on the market price of longevity risk and
the risk-sharing rule in the sub-population case deliver results which are similar to the single-population case.
5 Conclusion
This work studies the optimal portfolio strategy and benefit withdrawal rate for a pension scheme with an income-
drawdown policy in the decumulation phase. The optimal solutions under single- and sub-population cases are
obtained by applying the dynamic programming principle. The numerical study shows that the longevity bond can
be used to hedge the longevity risk, and both members and manager benefit from the longevity bond investment.
We believe that the development of a longevity market is required to provide a solution to capital markets for
longevity risk hedging. Moreover, both members and manager benefit from an agreement on the risk-sharing rule
in the long run. The problem with multiple longevity bonds issued on different populations is an interesting topic
which we will explore in our future study.
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The corresponding value function v(Y,λ) of the optimisation problem (4) is given by
v(Y,λ) = sup
αS,αL,β
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e–
∫ s
0
(r+λj (u))du
(
ln(β(s)) + φλj (s) ln(Y(s))
)
ds
]
.
Applying Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP) to the value function gives
v(y , z ) ≥ E
[∫ t
0
e–
∫ s
0
(r+λj (u))du
[
ln(β(s)) + φλj (s) ln(Y(s))
]
ds
]
+ E
[
e–
∫ t
0
(r+λi (u))duv(Yyt ,λ
λ
t )
]
. (9)
Applying Itô’s formula to e–
∫ t
0
(r+λi (u))duv(Yyt ,λ
λ
t ) and substituting it into the DPP (9) leads to
0 ≥E
[∫ t
0
e–
∫ s
0
(r+λj (u))du
[
ln(β(s)) + φλj (s) ln(Y(s))
]
ds
]
– E
[∫ t
0
(r + λj (s))e
–
∫ s
0
(r+λj (u))duv(Yys ,λλs )ds
]
+ E
[∫ t
0
e–
∫ s
0
(r+λj (u))duLαS,αL,βv(Yys , Zzs )ds
]
.
Dividing by t and taking t → 0 leads to
0 ≥ φλj ln y – (r + λj )v(y ,λ) + ln(β) + LαS,αL,βv(y ,λ),
and we obtain the HJB equation
0 = φλj ln y – (r + λj )v(y ,λ) + sup
αS,αL,β
[
ln(β) + LαS,αL,βv(y ,λ)
]
,
where
Lα,bv(y ,λ) =Vy
ry + αSσSθS + αL n–1∑
i ,j=1
σijL θj – β
+A′(t ,λ)Vλ + 12 tr (Σ′ΣVλλ)
+
1
2
α2Sσ2S + α2L n–1∑
j=1
(n–1∑
i=1
σijL
)2Vyy + αL n–1∑
k=1
n–1∑
j=1
(n–1∑
i=1
σijL
)
σkj
Vyλk .
21
Solving the first order conditions on β(t), αS(t) and αL(t) gives
β∗(t) = 1
Vy
,
α∗S(t) = –
θSVy
σSVyy
,
α∗L(t) = –
∑n–1
i ,j=1 σ
ij
L θjVy +
∑n–1
i ,j=1 σ
ij
L Σ
′Vyλ∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L
)2
Vyy
. (10)
Substituting (10) into the HJB equation leads to
0 =φλj ln y – (r + λj )V – ln
(
Vy
)
+ ryVy – 1 +A′Vλ +
1
2
tr
(
Σ′ΣVλλ
)
–
1
2
V2y
Vyy
θ2S –
(∑n–1
i ,j=1 σ
ij
L θj
)2
∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L
)2
 – 12
[∑n–1
k=1
(∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L
)
σkj
)
Vyλk
]2
Vyy
∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L
)2
–
Vy
Vyy
(∑n–1
i ,j=1 σ
ij
L θj
)(∑n–1
k=1
(∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L
)
σkj
)
Vyλk
)
∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L
)2 . (11)
We guess the solution to the PDE (11) is of the following form
V(y ,λ) = G(λ) ln y +H(λ),
with boundary conditions
lim
t→∞v(Y
y
t , Z
z
t ) = 0, limt→∞G(Z
z
t ) = 0, limt→∞H(Z
z
t ) = 0.
The PDE (11) now becomes
0 =φλj ln y – (r + λj )(G ln y +H) – lnG+ ln y + rG – 1 +A′(Gλ ln y +Hλ) +
1
2
tr
(
Σ′Σ (Gλλ ln y +Hλλ)
)
+
1
2
θ2S –
(∑n–1
i ,j=1 σ
ij
L θj
)2
∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L
)2
G+ 12
[∑n–1
k=1
(∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L
)
σkj
)
Gλk
]2
G
∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L
)2
+
(∑n–1
i ,j=1 σ
ij
L θj
)(∑n–1
k=1
(∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L
)
σkj
)
Gλk
)
∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L
)2 .
Separating the ln y terms and we get two ODEs
0 =φλj – (r + λj )G + 1 +A
′Gλ +
1
2
tr
(
Σ′ΣGλλ
)
,
0 = – (r + λj )H – lnG+ rG – 1 +A′Hλ +
1
2
tr
(
Σ′ΣHλλ
)
+
1
2
θ2S –
(∑n–1
i ,j=1 σ
ij
L θj
)2
∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L
)2
G
+
(∑n–1
i ,j=1 σ
ij
L θj
)(∑n–1
k=1
(∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L
)
σkj
)
Gλk
)
∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L
)2 + 12
[∑n–1
k=1
(∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L
)
σkj
)
Gλk
]2
G
∑n–1
j=1
(∑n–1
i=1 σ
ij
L
)2 .
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We only need G(λ) to get the optimal solutions so we solve the first ODE for G(λ) and get
G(λ) = E
[∫ ∞
0
(φλj (s) + 1)e
–
∫ s
0
(r+λj (u))duds
]
.
G(λ) has a dynamic version as
G(t ,λ) = Et
[∫ ∞
t
(φλj (s) + 1)e
–
∫ s
t
(r+λj (u))duds
]
.
Substituting G(t ,λ) into (10) gives the optimal solutions in Proposition 1.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We first give the calculations for A0(t , s) and A1(t , s). Under OU setting (5), denote by h(t , s) =
Et
[
e–
∫ s
t
λ(u)du
]
and applying Itô’s formula to e–
∫ t
0
λ(u)duh(t , s) and letting dt term equals to 0, we obtain
0 = –λh + ht + hλ(a1 – b1λ) +
1
2
σ21hλλ
As the λ(t) follows affine class model, we guess h(t , s) has the following form
h(t , s) = eA0(t ,s)–A1(t ,s)λ(t),
with terminal conditions h(s , s) = 1, A0(s , s) = 0 and A1(s , s) = 0.
Differentiating h(t , s) and plugging into (B) leads to two ODEs
0 =
∂A0
∂t
– a1A1 +
1
2
σ21A
2
1,
0 = –
∂A1
∂t
+ b1A1 – 1.
Solving these ODEs gives A0(t , s) and A1(t , s) in Proposition 2.
Similarly, denote by hQ(t , s) = EQt
[
e–
∫ s
t
λ(u)du
]
and assume hQ(t , s) = eA
Q
0 (t ,s)–A
Q
1 (t ,s)λ(t), we obtain that
AQ1 (t , s) = A1(t , s). Moreover, we have σL(t) = –A
Q
1 (t , t +T)σ1 = –A1(t , t +T)σ1.
Next, we show the derivation of G(t ,λ). According to Proposition 1, we have
G(t ,λ) =φ
∫ ∞
t
Et
[
λ(s)e–
∫ s
t
λ(u)du
]
e–r(s–t)ds +
∫ ∞
t
Et
[
e–
∫ s
t
λ(u)du
]
e–r(s–t)ds .
To solve Et
[
λ(s)e–
∫ s
t
λ(u)du
]
, we denote by Z˜(t) = E˜t [e
–
∫ s
0
λ(u)du
]
E˜[e
–
∫ s
0
λ(u)du
]
, m(t , s ,λ) = eA0(t ,s)–A1(t ,s)λ(t) and D(t) =
e–
∫ t
0
λ(u)du and have
Et
[
λ(s)e–
∫ s
t
λ(u)du
]
= Et
λ(s)e–
∫ s
t
λ(u)du
h(t , s)
 h(t , s) = Et
[
λ(s)
Z˜(s)
Z˜(t)
]
h(t , s).
Let Et
[
λ(s) Z˜(s)
Z˜(t)
]
= E˜t [λ(s)], where E˜[·] denotes the expectation under measure P˜ which is equivalent to P and
will be specify later. Applying Itô’s formula to Z˜(t) gives
dZ˜(t) =dD(t)
m(t , s ,λ)
m(0, s ,λ)
+
D(t)
m(0, s ,λ)
dm(t , s ,λ)
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= – λ(t)Z˜(t)dt +
D(t)
m(0, s ,λ)
(
mt +mλ(a1 – b1λ) +
1
2
σ21mλλ
)
dt +
D(t)
m(0, s ,λ)
mλσ1dW1(t)
=σ1
mλ(t , s ,λ)
m(t , s ,λ)
Z˜(t)dW1(t)
= – σ1A1(t , s)Z˜(t)dW1(t)
Now, we can define P˜ through Z˜(s)
dP˜
dP
= Z˜(s) = exp
(
–
∫ s
0
σ1A1(u , s)dW1(u) –
1
2
∫ s
0
σ21A
2
1(u , s)du
)
,
and we have
dW˜1(t) = dW1(t) + σ1A1(t , s)dt .
Thus, we have
dλ(t) = (a1(t) – b1λ(t)) dt + σ1
(
dW˜1(t) – σ1A1(t , s)dt
)
=
(
a1(t) – b1λ(t) – σ21A1(t , s)
)
dt + σ1dW˜1(t),
taking expectation under P˜ leads to
dE˜t [λ(u)]
du
= a1(u) – σ21A1(u , s) – b1E˜t [λ(u)].
The solution of the above ODE is then obtained
E˜t [λ(s)] = λ(t)e–b1(s–t) +
∫ s
t
(
a1(u) – σ21A1(u , s)
)
e–b1(s–u)du .
Substituting E˜t [λ(s)] gives the function G(t ,λ) in Proposition 2.
C Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We first show the calculations for C0(t , s), C1(t , s) and C2(t , s). Denote by f (t , s) = Et
[
e–
∫ s
t
λ2(u)du
]
and applying Itô’s formula to e–
∫ t
0
λ2(u)du f (t , s) and letting dt term equals to 0, we get
0 = –λ2f + ft + fλ1(a1 – b1λ1) + fλ2(a2 – b21λ1 – b22λ2) +
1
2
fλ1λ1σ
2
1λ1
+
1
2
fλ2λ2(σ
2
21λ1 + σ
2
22λ2) + fλ1λ2σ1σ21λ1,
As λ1(t) and λ2(t) follow affine class models, we guess f (t , s) has the following form
f (t , s) = eC0(t ,s)–C1(t ,s)λ1(t)–C2(t ,s)λ2(t),
with terminal conditions f (s , s) = 1, C0(s , s) = 0, C1(s , s) = 0 and C2(s , s) = 0.
Differentiating f (t , s) and plugging into (C) leads to three ODEs
0 = –
∂C0
∂t
– a1C1 – a2C2 +
1
2
σ21C
2
1 +
1
2
(
σ221 + σ
2
22
)
C22 + σ1σ21C1C2,
0 = –
∂C1
∂t
+ b1C1 + b21C2,
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0 = –
∂C2
∂t
+ b22C2.
Solving these ODEs leads to C0(t , s), C1(t , s) and C2(t , s) in Proposition 4.
Similar with Proposition 4, to obtain G(t ,λ1,λ2), we first solve E˜t [λ1(s)] and E˜t [λ2(s)] under P˜ which is
defined as
dP˜
dP
= Z˜(s) = exp
(
–
∫ s
0
θ˜′(u , s)dW(u) – 1
2
∫ s
0
∥∥θ˜(u , s)∥∥2 du) ,
where
θ˜(u , s) =
 σ1C1(u , s) + σ21C2(u , s)σ22C2(u , s)
0
 ,
dW˜(u) = dW(u) + θ˜(u , s)du .
Then, solve the following two ODEs
dE˜t [λ1(u)]
du
= a1(u) – σ21C1(u , s) – σ1σ21C2(u , s) – b1E˜t [λ1(u)],
dE˜t [λ2(u)]
du
= a2(u) – σ1σ21C1(u , s) – (σ221 + σ
2
22)C2(u , s) – b21E˜t [λ1(u)] – b22E˜t [λ2(u)],
we obtain
E˜t [λ1(s)] =λ1(t)e–b1(s–t) +
∫ s
t
(
a1(u) – σ21C1(u , s) – σ1σ21C2(u , s)
)
e–b1(s–u)du ,
E˜t [λ2(s)] =
b21
b1 – b22
λ1(t)
[
e–b1(s–t) – e–b22(s–t)
]
+ λ2(t)e–b22(s–t)
+
b21
b1 – b22
∫ s
t
e–b1(s–u)
[
a1(u) – σ21C1(u , s) – σ1σ21C2(u , s)
]
du
–
∫ s
t
e–b22(s–u)
[ b21
b1 – b22
a1(u) – a2(u) + σ1σ21C1(u , s)
+
(
σ221 + σ
2
22 –
b21σ1σ21
b1 – b22
)
C2(u , s)
]
du .
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